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Resumo
Este artigo discute o papel comparativo do protecionismo sobre o crescimento econômico brasileiro 
e português no período 1860-1950 no contexto das aproximações teóricas disponíveis da Economia 
Internacional. Embora o papel das tarifas tenha sido longamente discutido na historiografia dos dois 
países, este artigo fornece o primeiro exercício que usa a metodologia baseada na aproximação macro-
econométrica para sucessões cronológicas de longa duração. Dada a conclusão de Clemens e Williamson 
de que o enquadramento mundial conta, testamos para os dois países a sua pretensão do tariff reversal 
paradox. As experiências brasileira e portuguesa confirmam que a proteção esteve correlacionada com 
o crescimento no período anterior à Primeira Guerra Mundial, e não é provável que comércio mais livre 
tivesse aumentado o crescimento econômico português, contrariamente à tese estabelecida. A Primeira 
Guerra Mundial, contudo, foi um momento decisivo para o Brasil. Ao fazer-se este estudo, usaram-se os 
melhores dados disponíveis, partindo-se ocasionalmente dos usados por Clemens e Williamson. As nossas 
conclusões prevalecem com dados alternativos.
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abstRaCt
This paper discusses the comparative role of protectionism on Brazilian and Portuguese economic growth 
for the period 1860-1950 in the context of the available theoretical approaches from international econom-
ics. Although the role of tariffs has long been debated in the historiography of both countries, this paper 
provides the first exercise that uses a methodology based on a macro-econometric approach for long-run 
time-series. Given Clemens’ and Williamson’s conclusion that the world environment matters, we test 
their claim for two countries on the tariff reversal paradox. The Brazilian and the Portuguese experiences 
confirm that protection was correlated with growth in the period before World War I, and it is unlikely 
that freer trade would have increased Portuguese growth, contrary to the established thesis. The First 
World War, however, was a turning point for Brazil. In carrying out this study, we have used the best data 
available to us, occasionally departing from those used by Clemens and Williamson. Our conclusions hold 
for alternative data sets.
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1 IntRoductIon
Protection and free trade have long been debated in economic theory and economic 
history. However, it is possible to say that the precise relationship between openness 
or free trade and long run economic growth remains a difficult theoretical issue that 
is being explored in a variety of ways.1 Do open economies grow faster than closed 
economies?
The answer is one to which economic historians can contribute, because, according 
to Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (1997) “mainstream economics (…) does not leave any 
room for policy effects on long-run economic growth”.2 Moreover, past (classical and 
neoclassical) economics could not answer this question because it requires a global 
approach that only general equilibrium and recent developments in game theory can 
provide.3 So, an economic history approach may present empirical findings that will 
challenge theoretical analysts to provide new solutions.
The literature was based on the Smithian and Ricardian conclusions reinforced by 
the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem that recommends free trade as the best commercial 
policy because of its positive effects on growth and welfare of both commercial 
partners. This doctrine that is focused on improvements in the level of income is 
based on static frameworks that may limit the interpretation of long-run effects. 
It was in turn reinforced with the Stopler-Samuelson theorem that pointed to an 
increase of the remuneration for scarcer mobile productive factors in a freer trade 
context. Using this theoretical context, economic historians may ask why so many 
times and in so many countries governments used protectionist policies, if free trade 
was so favorable to growth and welfare?4 Of course, one may concede that political 
lobbying may explain protectionism because of the redistribution effects on revenue 
that are involved in the so-called specific-factors models. In these schemes, trade 
liberalization provokes losses in all productive factors associated with the import-
competing sectors against other (immobile) factors.  However, it is possible that 
in many countries trade policy depended much more on the personal preferences 
and ideas of politicians, because, speaking historically, their constituents rarely had 
strong preferences about trade policy and even more rarely communicated them to 
their political representatives. As Bauer and Dexter (1972) conclude trade policy 
remains an unfathomable issue for the lay public today.
Clemens and Williamson (2002) - CW from now on - use an economic history ap-
proach to study the effects of protection on economic growth from 1860 to 1950. 
1  For a perspective based on sociological and political views, see Milner (1999).
2  p. 425.
3  Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (1997, p. 426).
4  For a survey on this question see Rodrik (1995).
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They employ a sample of 35 countries using a cross-section analysis for panel data. 
They conclude that protection favoured growth before the Second World War. Since 
growth after 1945 or 1950 coincides with openness, World War II was surely a 
turning point, they say.  They remark that “economists have had to look for more late 
20th century proof to support the openness-fosters-growth hypothesis”.5  In fact, the asso-
ciation between openness and growth in the postwar period is no longer undispu-
ted. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001) raise questions about several papers that try to 
prove that openness was centrally related to growth after World War II.  In fact, 
according to Rodrik (1999) “today the benefits of openness are oversold routinely in the 
policy-relevant literature”. Also, according to Yanikkava (2003), trade liberalization 
does not have a simple and straightforward relationship with growth.6
CW argue that there is a tariff reversal paradox, because before World War II pro-
tection was favorable to, or at least associated with, economic growth. Curiously, 
thirty years ago Bairoch (1972) had also concluded that European “protectionist 
countries grew faster in the nineteenth century, not slower, as every economist has found 
for the late twentieth century”.7 Bairoch reached this conclusion without considering 
variables other than growth and tariffs, but Kevin O’Rourke (2000) provides new 
credibility to Bairoch’s thesis by using a macro-econometric analysis with a large 
array of growth-related variables. CW use a similar methodology for checking the 
tariff-growth paradox. 
This paper examines how the thesis of the tariff reversal paradox applies in two 
cases, those of Brazil and Portugal, considering the period from the 1860s-1870s to 
1945.  Both of these countries were included in the CW data set.8
2  contExtualIzInG tHE BRazIlIan and PoRtuGuEsE casEs
CW grouped thirty-five countries into four regional “clubs” — “Core, Rich 
European Offshoots, European Periphery, and LDCs—the country members of 
which are: 4 members of the industrial Core (France, Germany, UK, US); 7 rich 
European Offshoots (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Cuba, New Zealand, 
Uruguay); 10 from the European Periphery (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Greece, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden); and 14 less developed 
countries (LDCs) in Asia, the Mideast and Latin America (Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, 
5 Clemens and Williamson (2002, p.1).  
6 For the positive openness-fosters-growth theory see Harrison (1996), Bloom and Williamson (1998), 
Greenway, Morgan and Wright (2002).
7 Clemens and Williamson (2002, p. 7).
8 Note that Brazilian data only begin in 1870. The authors in a few cases substituted data sets that they 
considered more detailed and accurate than those used in CW.
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China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, 
Siam, Turkey)”.9  Obviously, these categories apply to the beginning of the period 
studied (1860-1998).  CW concluded that protection was associated with growth 
before World War II for each of the clubs across the period 1860-1950.  However, 
they do not generalize this result to all member countries in each club.  
The four clubs present in CW (2002) had quite different levels of unweighted regio-
nal averages of “own tariffs” across the period beginning in 1865 until 1950. Taking 
the average tariff rate as the ratio between  the total value of import duties and that 
of imports as the most convenient measure to assess openness across countries10, 
CW found that the four clubs present quite different levels of unweighted regional 
averages of “own tariffs” in the period 1865-1950. Before the First World War the 
rich offshoots were the most protected group, usually above 20%. The European 
periphery fluctuated from 10 to 20%, while the core group was always below 15%. 
Although the LDCs group was also below the 15% level until the 1890s, they in-
creased their average protection from then to the First World War, almost reaching 
the protection level of the rich offshoots.11  In fact, the average Latin American rates 
were far higher than those of the LDC group as a whole.12 
Turning to Portugal and Brazil, we note that although major differences separate 
the two countries’ economies, such as the obvious differences of size and climate, 
many economic and cultural traits link the two countries.  Portugal, like Brazil, 
had a low growth rate of GDP per capita in the latter nineteenth century, and was 
near the bottom of the European periphery in that period. Beyond the common 
language, religion, and historical traditions of Portugal and Brazil, there was the 
important fact that they shared very similar constitutions during most of the 19th 
century.  Both charters were “granted” by the same man, who was Emperor of Brazil 
(as Pedro I) and subsequently King of Portugal (as Pedro IV). The two countries 
were also bound by strong economic ties in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries—most obviously through Portuguese emigration to Brazil, which produ-
ced remittances of great importance in Portugal’s balance of trade, but also through 
commerce itself (the sale of tropical products to Portugal in exchange for industrial 
and Mediterranean goods).  These links are necessarily ignored in a cross-section 
analysis for a data panel. A significant difference between the two is the role of 
Brazil’s tropical exports as a leading reason for its dependence on international 
9   Clemens and Williamson (2002, p. 3).  
10 “among the explicit policy measures of openness available, the average tariff rate is by far the most homogenous 
protection measure and the easiest to collect across countries and over time,” according to John H. Coatsworth 
and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Always Protectionist? Latin American Tariffs from Independence to Great 
Depression, Journal of latin american studies, p. 207, May 2004.
11 Clemens and Williamson (2002, Figure 2).
12  Coatsworth and Williamson (2004); Rubio (2006).
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markets and consequent volatility in economic performance, while Portugal never 
exported enough to compensate for her imports.13 
In the case of Brazil, the country began its national experience with a low tariff 
(15%) that had been forced on both Brazil and Portugal by Britain in 1810, while 
Brazil was still a Portuguese colony. Brazil asserted its independence in commercial 
policy in 1844, upon the expiration of the treaty with Britain, roughly doubling the 
average tariff to about 30%.  In the period of the Belle Epoque, when Latin America 
led the world in high tariffs, only Colombia surpassed Brazil’s tariff levels, which 
peaked at 40% in the decade 1900-1909, the same decade in which Brazil doubled it 
exports per capita14.  Brazil’s dependence on customs duties is ironic, in that the pre-
vailing rhetoric by that time, most forcefully expressed by Finance Minister Joaquim 
Murtinho (1898-1902), was that of comparative (or absolute) advantage.  Murtinho 
would do nothing for "artificial" industries (manufacturing) in the financial crisis 
of 1901-1902 because he believed that equal treatment of all economic activities by 
the state would amount to "socialism."15  
As for Portugal, it raised its customs in 1837, although the full impact on trade came 
only with the new treaty with Britain, signed in 1842.  Tariffs remained high in the 
nineteenth century although a free trade philosophy was concurrently defended in 
intellectual circles and in the Parliament.16 Pereira (1983) advanced the view that 
relatively free trade prevailed in Portugal after 1852, when a new tariff system was 
introduced in line with the liberal ideology of the Regenerador Party. Such policy 
produced low growth rates and persistent trade deficits during the rest of the cen-
tury. Reis (1984 and 1993) disagrees because, although political ideology could 
be described as liberal and favourable to free trade, Portuguese average tariffs were 
high throughout the second half of the century. He even argues that if a higher level 
of protection had been introduced, the impact on growth would have been slight, 
because the small size of the domestic market would have virtually ruled out import 
substitution.17 This line of reasoning led to the prevailing idea that “the simplest 
means of raising real revenue per capita would have been increasing ‘foreign depend-
ence’ (…) as happened in other European countries”.18 
For CW, trade partners may belong to the same economic “clubs” or not. It is more 
common for partners to belong to different regions or clubs, a fact that explains the 
13 For Brazil, see Goldsmith, (1986, p. 14). For Portugal, Mata (2002, p. 54-55).
14 Data from Clemens-Williamson appendix; Rubio (2006, p. 7) (on Brazilian exports).
15 Murtinho (n.d, p. Xiii).
16 Matta (2006a).
17 Reis (1993a, p 18-20).
18 Reis (1993a, p. 270). More recently, Fontoura and Valério (2000) also contradict Pereira (1983) because 
“during the period of intentional freer trade [1852-1890s] economic growth benefited (…); [but] during the 
period of intentional protectionism, economic growth was handicapped” (p. 185-186).
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strong variation of the average tariffs within the clubs.  The intent of this paper is 
to examine the CW thesis on tariff reversal for two countries in different clubs.
As Figure I shows, both Brazil and Portugal experienced similar levels of tariff pro-
tection.  Since Brazil was also an important trading partner for Portugal, the similar 
path of the average tariff in both countries merits discussion.
FIGuRE 1 – avERaGE taRIFF (RatIo BEtwEEn tHE total valuE oF 
IMPoRt dutIEs and tHat oF IMPoRts) Unit: Percentage
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In both countries big decreases occurred in three periods: late 1880s-early 90s, 
1914-30 grosso modo,19 and late 1930s-50. This means that main declines tended to 
occur in association with the global crisis of the 1890s and the two world wars and 
the Great Depression; they were in great measure a consequence of changes in the 
price level. (Brazil’s wider swings are associated with the monocultural dependence 
on coffee prices.)  Most of the tariffs were specific duties, expressed in monetary 
values per kilo or ton, for example. Sharp increases in prices inflated the value of 
imports in the denominator of the fraction used to estimate the average tariff. Thus 
the impact of inflations during the two world wars was spectacular in diminishing 
the average tariff both in Brazil and Portugal, as happened in many countries around 
19 In Brazil, the fall of customs revenues as a share of the value of imports actually begins after 1906, 
and results from a rising level of inflation under President Afonso Pena.  His two predecessors during 
1898-1906 had successfully pursued orthodox financial policies to satisfy Brazil’s main creditor, the 
Rothschild Bank.  On the rate of inflation, see E. Reis (2002, unpaginated graph 2).
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the world.20 At the same time, each country’s partners’ tariffs influenced the tariff 
rates of Brazil and Portugal, as an international game was being played. So, the 
world environment matters for individual countries, as CW found for their clubs.
In the remainder of the paper, we will examine the effects of tariffs on growth in 
our two case studies. Detailed scrutiny of individual countries can show instructive 
similarities and contrasts between the national experiences in tariff reversal, even 
when the two countries had comparable levels of protection.
Before entering into the details, however, it is necessary to consider the quality of the 
data. Figures for Brazilian economic growth in CW are those of Maddison (2001), a 
source that in turn is based on Goldsmith for the years 1850-1900 (1986).21  Several 
scholars have argued that Goldsmith’s data on growth are not reliable,22 and he 
does not provide the sources for the figures he uses.  It seems that the best data are 
still those of Cláudio Contador and Cláudio Haddad, hereafter cited as CH.23  CH 
data exhibits more variability than that of Clemens and Williamson (derived from 
Goldsmith), especially before 1900, and hence it was preferred to the CW data. 
The CH data have been corrected for a typographic error.  Figures for Portuguese 
GDP, as in CW, come from Neves [1994], after conversion to 1990 USA dollars.24 
However, Valério’s Portuguese Historical Statistics offers better data for railways, 
labor force, and arable land than those in CW, so we use them for Portugal.25
3 FRaMInG tHE EFFEcts oF PRotEctIon on GRowtH
So, what is the role of the country’s own average tariff on long-run economic gro-
wth in Portugal and Brazil? 
Using macro-econometric analysis of time series to explore the connections between 
protection and growth, one must tread warily.  The theoretical endeavors to ex-
plain a positive correlation between tariffs and growth is presented in the Clemens-
Williamson’s paper, using several arguments.  
20  As noted in CW.
21  See Maddison (2001, p. 143).
22 Personal communications from Luis Catão, William Summerhill, and Gail Triner.  Superimposing 
the CW estimate of Brazilian growth and that of Contador and Haddad  shows much greater annual 
variability in the latter, and growth before 1900 in the CW graph is almost zero from 1870 to 1899. 
From this fact one might infer that the pre-1900 data in CW were simply a backward projection by 
Goldsmith.  The two series behave similarly in the period 1900-1950. See Appendix 2.
23 Contador and Haddad (1975).  Estimates of the size of the national product were based on imports and 
exports, government expenditures after 1901, electrical energy installed after 1883, and consumption 
of cement.
24  Clemens and Williamson (2002, p. A-9).
25  Valério (2001). 
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First of all, co-ordination of tariff policy among trading partners must be con-
sidered. If countries do not coordinate their tariff policy, they face a prisoner’s 
dilemma, as CW assert:  Each will be better off in the absence of tariffs, but if co-
ordination is not achieved, each country will seek its privately optimal level of tariffs, 
even when the result is collectively sub-optimal (because growth and trade would be 
greater if no trade barriers existed at all). Before the Second World War only a few 
countries achieved co-ordination (and for limited periods), leading to the possibility 
that tariffs and growth were positively correlated in countries that adopted tariffs. 
Therefore, the model needs to include not only the variable “own tariff”, but also 
the variable “partners’ tariff”26. Note that Coatsworth and Williamson even discuss 
whether “latin american governments pursued protectionist policies because they learned 
through trial and error that high tariffs promote economic growth.”27  
Clemens and Williamson also consider that reforms in national tariff systems may 
have targeted different goods with differently-shaped supply and demand curves and 
thus different tariff-related benefits and costs. Moreover, in a long-run perspective 
for industrialization, distortions in costs may alter terms-of-trade benefits, affecting 
the relation between own tariff and own performance that may explain a historical 
reversal. Protection policies may also include moves from tariff to non-tariff barri-
ers; moreover, these shifts may be “bundled” with significant changes in domestic 
fiscal systems.  Such policy restructuring may also help explain reversal paradoxes. 
Furthermore, other changes in policies or conditions affecting growth also occurred 
massively, such as economic and institutional changes resulting from decoloniza-
tion. But this situation did not affect Portugal and Brazil in the period under study; 
therefore, it may be discarded.
Finally, the effective distance to the main trade partners must be included, to take 
into account the effects of distance in international trade. Following CW, we intro-
duce this consideration for Portugal and Brazil. Naturally, commercial relations with 
more distant partners are negatively affected by higher costs of transportation. In 
addition, most of the studies of the effects of tariffs on growth disregard distance. 
Especially in the pre-1914 era, distance was important, because this “tyranny of 
distance” worked as a natural tariff, provoking distortions in trade and growth. 
The CW model includes the “average distance to trading partners”, since distance 
may “contaminate” the influence of tariffs on trade and growth. On the other hand, 
underdeveloped countries such as Portugal and Brazil before World War II could 
26  Following CW, “partners’ tariff” includes the weighted averages of the five most important trading 
partners: “the index of tariffs in principal trading partners is calculated as the weighted average of own tariffs 
in the four or five countries to which the country in question exported the largest absolute value of goods…. the 
weights are the absolute value of exports that went to each of said partners. these partner export figures are 
taken from Mitchell… [1992, 1993, 1998]. In all cases, the vast majority of each country’s exports are accoun-
ted for by exports to these principal trading partners.” (CLEMENS; WILLIAMSON, 2002,  p. A-16).  
27  Coatsworth and Williamson (2004, p. 207).
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reap advantages from trading with more distant nations rather than neighbouring 
ones, if the distant economies were strongly complementary (e.g., offering industrial 
products for tropical goods). However, a reversal paradox may also have occurred 
because the great fall in transport prices in the late 19th century produced lower fi-
nal prices, and thereby greatly intensified world trade among all regions.  Domestic 
markets (particularly in urban centers) and export shares cannot be omitted in ex-
pressing the institutional dimensions of the industrialization process in some of the 
partners.  Capital, land-labor ratios and education, are the variables used to capture 
the effects of industrialization.
In short, the effects of tariffs on economic growth are clearly a complex phenom-
enon. In considering both supply-side and demand-side lines of reasoning in re-
cent literature, if one moves to the economics of growth, some of the variables 
incorporated in the model embody aspects of culture, and others, technology. The 
role of such embodied aspects is necessarily controversial. International economics 
since Romer (1986) connects the development of endogenous models of growth to 
neoclassical theories of development that include Solowian perspectives. Therefore, 
aspects such as education, capital, along with urbanization explain how growth de-
pends not only on factors of production, but also on the quality of these factors.28 
Furthermore, because the sharp fall in the average tariff rates during the two world 
wars was related to inflation and was exogenous to the tariff–growth paradox, we 
follow CW and omit the war years in the estimations.29  
The model employed is the following:
GROWTH = C + a.(TARIFF) + b.(PTNRTAR) + c.(TARIFF*PTNRTAR) 
+ d.(EFFDIST) + e.(TARIFF*EFFDIST) + f.(KIDSKOOLGR(-1)) + 
g.(RAILWAYSGR(-1)) + h.(EXPORTSGR(-1)) + i. (EXPORTS) + j. 
D(LANDLABOR) + l.(URBGR(-1))
where, using the terms employed by CW, GROWTH means the country’s own GDP 
per capita growth in order to control for the size of population. TARIFF means the 
country’s own average tariff, to proxy protection;30 PTNRTAR means the main 
partners’ average tariff;31 EFFDIST means the effective average distance from a giv-
28 Krugman (1991).
29 Defined here as 1914-1918, and 1939-1945.
30  Average tariff rates (in %) were taken from CW  and “are calculated as the total revenue from import duties 
divided by the value of total imports in the same year” (CLEMENS ; WILLIAMSON, 2002, p. A-1).
31 The index of tariffs in principal trading partners (in %) was taken from CW and “is calculated as the 
weighted average of own tariffs in the four or five countries to which the country in question exported the largest 
absolute value of goods” (CLEMENS ; WILLIAMSON , 2002, p. A-16).
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en country’s capital to the main partners’ capital cities;32 KIDSKOOLGR means the 
growth rate of schooling, to proxy education and human capital;33 RAILWAYSGR 
means the growth of the rail km network, to proxy the available physical capital in 
the economy;34 EXPORTS means export share and EXPORTSGR means exports’ 
growth;35 LANDLABOR means the land-labor ratio;36 and URBGR means the 
country’s own urbanization rate, to proxy domestic demand, considering 50 thou-
sand inhabitants as the bound to define an urban centre;37 TARIFF*PTNRTAR 
captures the joint effect of domestic tariffs and partners’ tariffs; and TARIFF* 
EFFDIST captures the joint effect of domestic tariffs and effective distance to the 
capital city of the main trade partner.
The growth of KIDSKOOL, RAILWAYS, EXPORTSGR and URBANIZATION 
are lagged by one year to eliminate the possibility of endogeneity of these variables. 
Otherwise, it could be debated whether growth in per capita GDP caused an incre-
ase in these variables, or vice versa.
We controlled for autocorrelation by estimating an autoregressive model, as it is a 
common finding in time series regressions that residuals are correlated with their 
own lagged values. Serial correlation violates the standard assumption of regression 
theory because OLS is no longer efficient among linear estimators. The Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test was used to detect serial correlation. The sta-
tionarity condition was tested by ascertaining that the inverted roots of the autore-
gressive processes lie within the unit circle.
To test the tariff reversal hypothesis, estimations were made for two sub-periods—
the pre-World War I years and the interwar years. 
32 Effective Distance from trading partners was taken from CW “calculated as the product of two quantities. 
the first quantity is the average distance from the capital city of the country in question to the capital cities 
of its principal trading partners, weighted by the value of exports going to each of those partners in the year in 
question”  (CLEMENS ; WILLIAMSON, 2002,  p. A-12).
33 Again, we use the method of CW: “Primary school enrollment rates for those of school age are calculated by 
dividing per capita primary enrollment rates by the fraction of the population under the age of 14. the frac-
tion of the population under the age of 14 is calculated from the appropriate editions of Mitchell (1992, 1993, 
1998),where the population distributions by age are provided for census years” (CLEMENS; WILLIAMSON, 
2002, p. A-15).
34 From Valério (2001), for Portugal and CW for Brazil. 
35 The export share is taken from CW and “is calculated as the ratio of exports to national income” 
(CLEMENS; WILLIAMSON, 2002 , p. A-11).
36 The land-labor ratio was taken from Valério (2001) for Portugal, and CW for Brazil: It “is calculated by 
dividing total area of arable (food) crops in hectares by labor force”   (CLEMENS ; WILLIAMSON, 2002, 
p. A-14).
37 It was taken from CW, as the ratio between the population living in centers above 50,000 inhabitants 
and total population.
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4  EstIMatInG tHE ModEl FoR tHE PRE-woRld waR I PERIod
The model specification shows that higher domestic tariffs were significantly cor-
related with an increase in GDP for both Portugal and Brazil before 1914. Testing 
the CW claim by estimating the model for the period before World War I in Tables 
1 and 2 of the Appendix, one may say that both the Portuguese and Brazilian cases 
confirm CW’s conclusion that protection was favourable to growth. Tariffs are a 
significant variable for the period before World War I. They mattered for growth, 
and the coefficient is positive. Thus a small European peripheral country employing 
a high level of protection — Portugal — and a similarly protectionist large South 
American country — Brazil — experienced growth, just as did the free trade-ori-
ented countries of the European core. 
According to the estimated results of Tables 1 and 2, partners’ tariffs were also signi-
ficant and positively correlated with an increase in the GDPs of Portugal and Brazil 
before 1914. Indeed, in both the Brazilian and Portuguese cases, partners’ tariff was 
twice as important as each country’s own tariff. Note that before World War I the 
average “own tariff” in the core European countries fluctuated from about 12 to 
18%, and co-ordination was achieved under the gold-standard regime. Its automatic 
rules on international trade and the existence of an international financial leader in 
the system, England, brought stability to the whole trading framework. The adop-
tion of higher tariffs by the rich European offshoots did not change the broad free 
trade environment prevailing in the second half of the nineteenth century.38 Even 
when tariffs in some core countries increased in the 1880s and 1890s, the average 
tariff for the whole core did not change radically. In such a world, less developed 
countries such as Portugal and Brazil could gain from maintaining high average 
“own tariffs”, as they could enjoy a privately unconditionally optimal situation. In 
the case of Brazil, the single main trading partner was the United States, a high tar-
iff country, but the U.S. did not significantly retaliate by raising tariffs against Brazil 
(see below). Moreover, although the free trade philosophy was widely defended in 
the Portuguese and Brazilian Parliaments, budgetary necessity put strong pressures 
on the governments to keep tariffs high; before World War I tariffs provided about 
one-third of central government revenue in Portugal and between half and two-
thirds of revenue in Brazil.39 
In Brazil, during the Empire (1822-1889) and the Republic that followed, as well as 
in Portugal, under monarchy and Republic (from 1910), specific tariffs were used in 
38 It is well-known, of course, that the movement toward free trade receded after the Great Depression 
began in 1873.
39 For Portugal, Mata (1993, p. 131); For Brazil, Fishlow (1972, p. 318) (2/3 of government income in 
the 1890s) and Rubio (2006, p. 29) (54% in 1900 and 1910).
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preference to ad valorem rates, because the latter were subject to greater fraud, owing 
to the discretion necessarily allowed to customs agents.40  This preference produced 
a great diminution of the value of tariffs in periods of rapid inflation, such as that 
during Brazil’s Encilhamento (“saddling up”) euphoria in 1889-91, and again toward 
the end of World War I.  The exchange rate also affected the real value of customs 
duties as a de facto source of protection. Beyond that, during the Brazilian Empire, 
tariffs sometimes had to be paid at an “official” specific rate which was higher than 
the real rate of exchange. For example, the João Alfredo Tariff of 1889 had a modal 
rate of 48% that rose to over 100% when “official” values were applied.  In Portugal, 
a parallel case is the “Hunger Law” (lei da Fome) on grains.41
Regarding distance, as noted above, the advantages of trade with distant regions 
arise from major differences in natural advantages that could overcome higher trans-
port costs. For Portugal, the role of distant partners (including the USA) is clear, 
as the coefficient of distance in Table 1 shows, while trade with nearer partners had 
less importance. Portugal may have suffered retaliation for her high duties, as Table 
1 indicates.  The joint effect of Portuguese tariffs and distance was also detrimental 
to growth.
In the Brazilian case, and probably more broadly, growth was possible with high 
tariffs because Brazil’s main trading partner, the United States, had the highest 
average tariff rate among the core countries.  For Brazil’s major export—coffee, of 
which Brazil supplied about 75% of world consumption around 1910—demand was 
very price-inelastic, and the United States could have raised tariffs on this product 
without lowering consumption (within a certain range). In a recent econometric 
study, Abreu and Fernandes show that Brazil, as a price-maker in the world market 
for coffee, could affect the world price by a combination of export taxes, import 
taxes, and stockpiling.  The tax on coffee exports was successfully passed through 
to foreign consumers.42
Even after the “valorization” program—the retention of coffee stocks to keep prices 
high (implemented in 1908)—the American government chose to apply its anti-
monopoly legislation rather than use the tariff route to retaliate against its trading 
partner. Table 2 confirms this effect, as TARIFF*EFFDIST is a non-significant 
variable. In any event, the U. S. action failed to lower the price of coffee more 
than temporarily, and Brazil had consistently higher tariffs than the United States 
until the mid-thirties, after which they were very similar.  All the same, Brazil and 
Colombia, the Latin American nations with the highest average tariffs as a share of 
40 Villela (2005, p. 46).  We thank Werner Baer for bringing this study to our attention.  The same point 
applied to other countries, as noted in CW.
41 Villela (2005, p.48); Reis (1984).
42 Abreu and Fernandes (2006, p. 21-22).
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the value of imports, apparently grew at a slower pace than those with lower rates 
within this high-tariff group.43
For Portugal, human capital proxied by education (CW’s KIDSKOOL) is significant 
and negatively correlated to an increase in GDP; it was not significant for Brazil. 
This may appear to be a strange result. One should bear in mind, however, that 
studies on education stress that long periods (of about 30 years) are necessary to 
produce effects on growth, and the sample is short.44  Still, the significance of the 
variable for Portugal and its negative role may highlight a spurious relationship, or 
it may indicate the widespread use of children in economic activities.
As for capital, proxied by railway growth, the correlation with GDP growth doesn’t 
achieve significance in Portugal, but in Brazil it was negatively correlated with gro-
wth. Why this occurred isn’t clear, but it may mean that the payoff to investment for 
sunk capital had not yet occurred, or less likely, perhaps, that opening the territory 
to foreign products decreased the sale of local and regional products. 
Regarding exports, tropical products in Brazil place that country in sharp contrast 
to Portugal.  In Brazil, exports provided almost 19% of GDP in 1900.45  In fact the 
export character of the Brazilian economy and the modest exports of Portuguese 
Mediterranean crops are evident in comparing results of Tables 1 and 2. It seems 
that exports were an important force in Brazilian growth, while urbanization was an 
important element in Portuguese growth. Brazil’s terms of trade took a secular turn 
downward after 1885, and there was continual pressure to raise tariffs to maintain 
government revenues. In addition, tariffs were seen as an instrument for promoting 
import substitution as early as the Alves Branco Tariff of 1844.46  However, there 
does not seem to have been any significant substitution effect until the period 1890-
1913.47 Even then, the tariff played less of a role in protecting industry than did 
inflation and a resulting fall in the value of the Brazilian currency, especially in the 
early 1890s.48
According to neoclassical explanations, the improvement in the land-labor ratios 
of protected economies such as Portugal enhanced growth before World War I, 
a period when agricultural production was a leading economic activity. Yet we 
should recall how significant Portuguese emigration was during the second half of 
43 Coatsworth and Williamson (2004, p. 231).  
44 According to Bils and Klenow (1998, p. 1): “Even faster-growing countries have at most modestly f latter 
cross-sectional experience-earnings profiles, consistent with a minority role for the channel from the schooling 
to growth”.  For the two-way relationship between education and growth, see Islam (1995).
45  Franco (1990, p. 14).
46  For food processing–sugar in particular–plus wrought iron and textiles.
47  Villela (2005, p. 46).
48  Fishlow (1972, p. 332).
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the nineteenth century for explaining the improvement of the land-labor ratio and 
productivity in the country.49 For Brazil, however, this variable was not significant 
in the pre-war period.
It should be noted that the sign and significance of these variables were found to be 
very robust to the inclusion or exclusion of other control variables. First of all, CW 
note that higher tariffs were associated with higher growth.50 They find a positive 
and significant relation between tariff and growth for the pre-World War I period 
after accounting for differences among the income-based “clubs.”51 However, for the 
LDC set (Brazil’s group), the coefficient of the tariff variable is small compared to 
the European periphery and the Core, i.e., almost one-fifth the magnitude.52 They 
find a robust positive coefficient for tariffs under alternative control variables, as we 
do for Brazil, but the magnitudes of coefficients are again very small for the LDC 
group compared to other groups. In summary, it seems that findings for Brazil here 
are much stronger than those of CW for the whole of their LDC club.
For Portugal, one might consider substituting Lains’ foreign trade data (1995). 
However, Lains’ figures stop at 1914 and are of questionable reliability, since they 
don’t match other items of the Portuguese balance of payments.53 Using data on 
adult literacy rate (instead of the KIDSKOOL growth rate) was another possibility, 
although it was not collected annually. Reestimating the model, we found its sign 
was negative and not significant during the years before WWI and the R-square 
decreased marginally. In the period between the wars, the sign was positive and not 
significant. The KIDSKOOL growth rate was retained in the results presented here 
to preserve the strict comparability of results between the two countries, as the adult 
literacy rate is not available for Brazil, except in census years. Using different data for 
Portugal’s GDP per capita from Maddison (2003), we reach similar conclusions on 
explaining growth and economic performance, pointing to the positive role of the 
domestic consumption for the performance of the Portuguese economy, a conclu-
sion also reached by Justino (1988, 1989). Repeating the estimation to explain GDP 
confirms these results in a similar R-square value. The established thesis that more 
free trade would have contributed for Portuguese growth54 is not confirmed for 
the period before World War I. In the case of Brazil, substituting the CW data for 
GDP growth for those of Contador and Haddad also reveals a significant positive 
correlation between tariffs and growth.
49  Serrão (1974). 
50  Clemens and Williamson (2002, p. 9 and Table 1).
51  See their Table 2.
52  Merely 0.0054 (= 0.0681 - 0.0627, Table 2, CW), compared to –0.0147 for the European periphery, 
+0.0233 for the core.
53  Mata (2002).
54  Reis (1984, 1993).
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5  EstIMatInG tHE ModEl FoR tHE IntERwaR PERIod
The novelty of the interwar period in studying the two national cases of Portugal 
and Brazil is the tariff reversal paradox for Brazil. As Tables 3 and 4 show tariffs 
continued to be a significant variable for growth in both countries, yet Portugal 
seems to have preserved the benefits of protection, while in Brazil tariffs and par-
tners’ tariffs became detrimental for the growth of the national economy.  In the 
1930s extensive import substitution took place in Brazil, during which time GDP 
grew almost 6% per year. In that decade it was rising domestic demand more than 
the tariff that drove industrial growth.55
In the 1920s and 1930s protection became the rule in international markets, but 
small closed economies, such as Portugal’s, were less affected.56 Self-sufficiency 
was the rule. According to Table 3, the increased tariffs of Portugal’s partners were 
beneficial for the Portuguese economy, a result that may be accepted only if those 
tariffs were mainly erected against other partners and not as a retaliation against 
the high Portuguese tariffs. Nonetheless, some losses occurred from the interaction 
of domestic tariffs and partners’ tariffs, as neoclassical theories and game theories 
suggest.
As for distance, for Portugal the advantages of trade with distant regions prevailed 
again over the greater transport costs to distant partners. Still, in line with neoclassi-
cal interpretations, the joint effect of Portuguese tariffs and distance was detrimental 
for growth.
The Brazilian terms of trade took a turn down again in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
in the same period exports became a negative variable for Brazilian growth, while 
export growth was positive. As noted, the role of tropical exports sharply distingui-
shes Brazil from Portugal. In fact, the export character of the Brazilian economy 
led to a detrimental dependence on foreign demand. In the prewar period, some of 
the import substitution was in food production, but more important was the rise of 
a cotton textile industry in the early 1890s.57 After World War I, higher partner’s 
tariffs were also negatively associated with Brazil’s growth. All this is in line with 
the neoclassical explanation of openness and growth. However, there were some 
gains for the Brazilian economy if both the home country and the trading partners 
maintained higher tariffs, as the positive coefficient of the joint effect of domestic 
55 Fishlow (1980, p. 104). However, Suzigan believes that in the 1930s falling exchange rate and exchange 
controls were more important forms of protection than tariffs for import substitution. (SUZIGAN, 
1986,  p. 351-352).
56 Rosas (1987).
57 Leff (1982, p. 149); Fishlow (1972, p. 312-313).
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and partners’ tariffs shows in Table 4.58 Once more Abreu and Fernandes (2006) 
confirm that retaliation from the USA against Brazil (and Chile) did not harm these 
national economies: (…) United States could not have exploited fully its market 
position due to the fact that it faced an elastic demand curve at the margin as it was 
a price taker for food exports.59 
CW grouped Brazil with the LDCs, but Coatsworth and Williamson argue that all 
the Latin American countries in the Clemens-Williamson sample, regardless of the 
“club” they were members of, as a group had the highest tariffs in the world from 
the 1860s until the 1920s.60 Nonetheless, the Latin American nations grew at a 
rapid rate in the “classic” era of export-led growth until World War I. In the period 
between 1919 and 1939, Brazil’s economy followed a neoclassical growth path. 
Increased physical capital (proxied by railway growth) and higher land-labor ratios 
resulting from the introduction of the mechanization of agriculture were positively 
correlated with GDP, as technical progress could lead to a Schumpeterian path of 
growth. The improvement in the land-labor ratio was also related to the closed-door 
policy for immigration that, in turn, may have stimulated investment in agricultural 
machinery.61  It is an irony that the neoclassical path was taken in a period of greater 
state intervention, excepting tariff collection.  
For Brazil, the distance from the trading partners became significant and negative 
after World War I. It may be that Brazil increased its trade with nearby partners 
rather than the United States and Europe. But the interaction of tariffs and distance 
was slightly positive.
Tables 3 for Portugal and 4 for Brazil show railway growth as a significant factor in 
explaining GDP growth. Agrarian countries benefited from opening their interior 
areas to investments from capital-rich nations. One should recognize that in neither 
country had the present-day rail network been completed by the First World War. 
After 1920 the density of the rail network continued to grow in both countries, and 
the two national markets became better integrated internally.62
58 The result also stands for the period before the Great Depression in a simplified version of the model 
that preserves the main variables only, because of the small number of observations. The variable is 
relevant and the coefficient is positive. 
59 p. 20.
60 Coatsworth and Williamson (2004, p. 206).  As noted above on p. 4-5, for CW, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Cuba, and Chile were “rich European offshoots” in the late 19th century, while Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, and Peru were LDCs.
61 After 1934, Brazil introduced quotas for immigrants based on nationality.  
62 Rosas (1987); Ludwig (1985, p. 242).  
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No other variables were significant in the Portuguese case. In the Brazilian case, the 
growth of schooling was negatively correlated and significant. Again, it may be that 
the economy primarily required unskilled labour, or that the payoff to investment 
in education was still in the future.
Note that R-square reveals good adjustment for the estimations in both countries.
How robust are the results obtained here, for both the period before WWI and the 
interwar years?
A model using moving averages was also estimated; however, it did not produce 
satisfactory results in terms of statistical significance of the coefficients. We therefore 
used an autoregressive model, the results of which are presented here.63 As recent 
international economics seeks to develop endogenous models of growth, it might 
be argued that most of the explanatory power of our model may be coming from 
the auto-correlated nature of growth. To check this argument, we ran tests for the 
joint significance of coefficients of the explanatory variables, and the results are 
available in the Appendix (Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8). They show that coefficients of the 
explanatory variables are significant and do explain the variation in growth, after 
autocorrelation is controlled for both countries in the two periods. We are therefore 
able to reject the null hypothesis that all the coefficients of the explanatory variables 
are jointly zero after accounting for lagged dependence in the growth variable. The 
model therefore has significant explanatory power.
6  conclusIon:  ExPlaInInG tHE REsults 
Results are quite clear. The CW methodology, using panel data, is much “thinner” 
than ours because cross-section analysis only captures long-term trends for the whole 
set of countries.  By contrast, this paper demonstrates for Brazil and Portugal how 
growth reacts to each variable in the two periods.  Brazil, contrary to the CW find-
ings, disconfirms the contention that tariffs were positive for growth after the First 
World War. These econometric findings should put an end to some of the hoary 
polemics among economic historians of the two countries and, most importantly, 
they can shed a new light on the theoretical approaches on the role of protection 
for growth.
The paper confirms the need of formal models that include international political 
contexts, to analyze tariff policy adoption and its effects on growth. It calls attention 
63 To measure long-term growth we would need to account for long-term impacts of other variables too, 
and we do not have long enough time series for Portugal and Brazil.
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(3): 461-492, jul-set 2008
478 a Reversal in the Historical Role of tariffs in Economic Growth? the cases of Brazil and Portugal
to long-run changes in the levels of modernization, mechanization or industrializa-
tion in trading partners for considering the effects on the costs and benefits of tariffs 
for their growth. Following CW, this paper shows the importance of co-ordination 
and retaliation, and should be a stimulus to the use of game theory approaches to 
the relationship between tariffs and growth.  It exemplifies a situation of decreased 
international market power that tended to increase the ratio of distortion costs to 
modest terms-of-trade benefits for Brazil in the interwar period.  The paper illus-
trates how important were distance and the cost of transport.
The positive association between tariffs and growth does not necessarily mean that 
tariffs were purposely and principally used to foster growth, although the role of 
tariffs in growth was often bound up in ideologies and political doctrines.  It is true 
that in Portugal and Brazil by the second half of the nineteenth century - as in many 
other countries of the periphery - the elites were aware of the economic success of 
the core nations and their offshoots. Portugal and Brazil now began to face up to 
the need for modernization. Even so, tariffs were collected primarily to supply the 
government with income.64 First of all, customs duties allowed the government to 
collect large revenues with very low costs, as only a small number of public servants 
were needed. Secondly, duties were a relatively reliable source of revenue, particularly 
when fluctuations in domestic economic activities decreased the returns from other 
taxes. Moreover, tariffs were a hidden tax, as the public did not distinguish them in 
the prices they paid for imported goods. Indeed, a good item for a future research 
agenda is exploring the extent to which this “fiscal amnesia” was important from a 
political perspective. Consequently, customs were an indispensable element in the 
Portuguese and Brazilian budgets.65 One may also concede that the high tariffs in 
both countries could result from pressures in parliament to protect certain econo-
mic activities, or from defined ideological programs. Both aspects were relevant for 
Brazil and Portugal. In fact, parliamentary sources offer long discourses on this 
issue, most of the time using erudite arguments derived from the late mercantilist 
writers, the classical authors, or the German Historical School.66 The benefits of 
competitiveness were countered by the contention that the low level of development 
required state intervention, or by direct references to the infant industry argument, 
an issue that future researchers will want to confirm or disconfirm. Cliometric 
applications of the theoretical arguments will help to explain the level of tariffs 
in each of the two countries, though the central concern was sufficient revenue 
for government operations. In particular, we need research on the price-elasticity 
of demand for imports in the two countries.  In Brazil, one may suppose that the 
64 Mata (2002); Goldsmith (1986).
65 Lains (1986; 1987); Justino (1988-1989); Fishlow (1972, p. 318).
66 Mata (2006a; 2006b).
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skewing of income distribution had an effect on the high level of imports, despite 
the country’s high tariffs.
The First World War was a turning point. In the 1920s Great Britain tried to 
restore the gold-standard system, which provided the international framework for 
co-operation.  Yet success was limited, even if both Portugal and Brazil temporarily 
returned to the gold standard. There was no single dominant trading partner for 
the international system in the interwar years, as Britain had been before 1914.67 
After 1930, protectionism rose in all countries. The collapse of international trade 
led to increasingly closed, self-sufficient economies.  The Great Depression affected 
Brazil, the large exporter country, more than Portugal, in its transformative effects 
on the country’s economic structure. Yet as late as 1937, the sudden recession in the 
United States hit Brazil hard, contributing to the crisis that brought about Vargas’s 
Estado Novo dictatorship. Portugal by contrast had to make a smaller adjustment, 
reorienting its economy toward trade with its African colonies.
Of course, the Second World War separates two worlds, with respect to international 
trade. As the Portuguese experience from the 1960s to the 1990s shows, generalized 
free trade, supra-national institutions, and more intensive globalization seems to 
produce more vigorous growth than protectionist policies. 
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aPPEndIx 1
taBlE 1 – PoRtuGal: PRE woRld waR I (1870 to 1913)
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/10/06   Time: 12:54
Sample(adjusted): 1873 1913
Included observations: 41 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -411.1478 97.79507 -4.204177 0.0003
TARIFF 14.73764 2.980733 4.944302 0.0000
PTNRTAR 37.82497 7.735509 4.889784 0.0000
TARIFF*PTNRTAR -1.222758 0.236662 -5.166692 0.0000
EFFDIST 0.151946 0.043969 3.455794 0.0020
TARIFF*EFFDIST -0.005107 0.001385 -3.686840 0.0011
KIDSKOOLGR(-1) -1.398864 0.507506 -2.756353 0.0108
RAILWAYSGR(-1) -0.247653 0.135405 -1.828979 0.0794
EXPORTSGR(-1) -0.001904 0.106368 -0.017902 0.9859
EXPORTS -0.079903 0.005033 -15.87664 0.0000
D(LANDLABOR) 222.1040 32.54802 6.823886 0.0000
URBGR(-1) 1.848252 0.845219 2.186713 0.0383
AR(1) -0.740632 0.190509 -3.887644 0.0007
AR(2) -1.025598 0.158432 -6.473437 0.0000
AR(3) -0.591261 0.203211 -2.909583 0.0075
AR(4) -0.433745 0.162631 -2.667046 0.0132
R-square 0.762311     Mean dependent var 0.475704
Adjusted R-square 0.619697     S.D. dependent var 5.018112
S.E. of regression 3.094605     Akaike info criterion 5.382989
Sum squared resid 239.4146     Schwarz criterion 6.051700
Log likelihood -94.35128     F-statistic 5.345285
Durbin-Watson stat 2.366629     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000121
Inverted AR Roots    .15+.85i    .15 -.85i   -.52+.57i   -.52 -.57i
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taBlE 2 – BRazIl: PRE woRld waR I PERIod (1870-1913)
Dependent Variable: GROWTH_CH_REV
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/10/06   Time: 10:53
Sample(adjusted): 1874 1913
Included observations: 40 after adjusting endpoints
Convergence achieved after 16 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -144.0525 55.09342 -2.614696 0.0147
TARIFF 3.085643 1.487860 2.073879 0.0481
PTNRTAR 6.042378 2.187723 2.761948 0.0104
TARIFF*PTNRTAR -0.116704 0.062032 -1.881338 0.0712
EFFDIST 0.006742 0.004553 1.480758 0.1507
TARIFF*EFFDIST -0.000207 0.000120 -1.730591 0.0954
KIDSKOOLGR(-1) -0.076950 0.512488 -0.150149 0.8818
RAILWAYGR(-1) -0.489500 0.079677 -6.143522 0.0000
EXPORTSGR(-1) -0.033600 0.040151 -0.836840 0.4103
EXPORTS 0.003042 0.001522 1.998786 0.0562
D(LANDLABOR) 0.258369 0.424217 0.609050 0.5478
AR(1) 0.434050 0.188119 2.307311 0.0293
AR(2) -0.152182 0.191239 -0.795768 0.4334
AR(3) -0.458930 0.172376 -2.662383 0.0131
R-square 0.733971     Mean dependent var 0.930320
Adjusted R-square 0.600957     S.D. dependent var 7.754088
S.E. of regression 4.898248     Akaike info criterion 6.284849
Sum squared resid 623.8135     Schwarz criterion 6.875957
Log likelihood -111.6970     F-statistic 5.517982
Durbin-Watson stat 1.721520     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000109
Inverted AR Roots    .52+.71i   .52 -.71i       -.60
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taBlE 3 - PoRtuGal: IntERwaR yEaRs (1919-1938)
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/10/06   Time: 12:47
Sample: 1919 1938
Included observations: 20
Convergence achieved after 29 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -58.77241 6.235699 -9.425152 0.0007
TARIFF 2.572809 0.530224 4.852309 0.0083
PTNRTAR 4.831242 0.675840 7.148496 0.0020
TARIFF*PTNRTAR -0.183266 0.029740 -6.162367 0.0035
EFFDIST 0.006318 0.001196 5.283467 0.0062
TARIFF*EFFDIST -0.000724 0.000253 -2.858406 0.0460
KIDSKOOLGR(-1) 0.291438 0.314838 0.925675 0.4070
RAILWAYSGR(-1) 0.361498 0.079151 4.567205 0.0103
EXPORTSGR(-1) -0.054181 0.056651 -0.956404 0.3930
EXPORTS 0.005783 0.003522 1.642229 0.1759
D(LANDLABOR) -104.8918 160.7227 -0.652626 0.5496
URBGR(-1) 5.091244 2.701509 1.884592 0.1326
AR(1) -1.307265 0.187553 -6.970092 0.0022
AR(2) -1.932465 0.306541 -6.304102 0.0032
AR(3) -1.085927 0.277759 -3.909597 0.0174
AR(4) -0.639383 0.172203 -3.712967 0.0206
R-square 0.993706     Mean dependent var 4.012774
Adjusted R-square 0.970102     S.D. dependent var 10.47741
S.E. of regression 1.811662     Akaike info criterion 4.016929
Sum squared resid 13.12848     Schwarz criterion 4.813515
Log likelihood -24.16929     F-statistic 42.09920
Durbin-Watson stat 3.221034     Prob(F-statistic) 0.001229
Inverted AR Roots   -.17+.91i   -.17+.91i   -.48 -.71i   -.48+.71i
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taBlE 4 – BRazIl: IntERwaR yEaRs (1919 -1938)
Dependent Variable: GROWTH_CH_REV
Method: Least Squares
Date: 02/10/06   Time: 10:51
Sample: 1919 1938
Included observations: 20
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 705.3431 51.14605 13.79076 0.0000
TARIFF -14.06902 2.267978 -6.203331 0.0008
PTNRTAR -17.88354 1.961868 -9.115566 0.0001
TARIFF*PTNRTAR 0.528025 0.089552 5.896323 0.0011
EFFDIST -0.044360 0.005250 -8.448947 0.0002
TARIFF*EFFDIST 0.002050 0.000273 7.518072 0.0003
KIDSKOOLGR(-1) -0.446859 0.130699 -3.418985 0.0142
RAILWAYGR(-1) 15.03752 2.605313 5.771864 0.0012
EXPORTSGR(-1) 0.353743 0.040680 8.695743 0.0001
EXPORTS -0.028524 0.003213 -8.876979 0.0001
D(LANDLABOR) 131.6299 12.87388 10.22457 0.0001
AR(1) -1.025748 0.173970 -5.896113 0.0011
AR(2) -0.871892 0.297773 -2.928040 0.0264
AR(3) -0.120452 0.105328 -1.143588 0.2964
R-square 0.961339     Mean dependent var 2.675487
Adjusted R-square 0.877573     S.D. dependent var 8.748866
S.E. of regression 3.061190     Akaike info criterion 5.271512
Sum squared resid 56.22530     Schwarz criterion 5.968524
Log likelihood -38.71512     F-statistic 11.47651
Durbin-Watson stat 2.727919     Prob(F-statistic) 0.003397
Inverted AR Roots       -.17   -.43+.74i   -.43 -.74i
Est. econ., são Paulo, 38(3): 461-492, jul-set 2008
488 a Reversal in the Historical Role of tariffs in Economic Growth? the cases of Brazil and Portugal
taBlE 5 - tEst FoR JoInt sIGnIFIcancE oF ExPlanatoRy vaRIaBlEs 
FoR PoRtuGal: PRE-woRld waR I yEaRs
Redundant Variables: TARIFF PTNRTAR TARIFF*PTNRTAR EFFDIST
        TARIFF*EFFDIST KIDSKOOLGR(-1) RAILWAYSGR(-1)
        EXPORTSGR(-1) EXPORTS D(LANDLABOR) URBGR(-1)
F-statistic 6.754055 Probability 0.000039
Log likelihood ratio 56.54783 Probability 0.000000
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1873 1913
Included observations: 41
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.474612 0.727224 0.652636 0.5181
AR(1) 0.107319 0.188225 0.570161 0.5721
AR(2) -0.212188 0.146309 -1.450273 0.1556
AR(3) 0.088694 0.154654 0.573503 0.5699
AR(4) 0.046009 0.120017 0.383355 0.7037
R-square 0.055949  Mean dependent var 0.475704
Adjusted R-square -0.048946 S.D. dependent var 5.018112
S.E. of regression 5.139452 Akaike info criterion 6.225619
Sum squared resid 950.9030 Schwarz criterion 6.434592
Log likelihood -122.6252 F-statistic 0.533382
Durbin-Watson stat 1.911690 Prob(F-statistic) 0.712006
Inverted AR Roots    .48  -.05+.60i  -.05 -.60i   -.27
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taBlE 6 - tEst FoR JoInt sIGnIFIcancE oF ExPlanatoRy vaRIaBlEs 
FoR BRazIl: PRE-woRld waR I yEaRs
Redundant Variables: TARIFF PTNRTAR TARIFF*PTNRTAR EFFDIST
 TARIFF*EFFDIST KIDSKOOLGR(-1) RAILWAYGR(-1) EXPGR(-1)
        EXPORTS D(LANDLABOR)
F-statistic 2.246096 Probability 0.04756768
Log likelihood ratio 24.90648 Probability 0.005526
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: GROWTH_CH_REV
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1874 1913
Included observations: 40
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.338674 1.809199 0.187195 0.8526
AR(1) 0.767012 0.160642 4.774655 0.0000
AR(2) -0.025884 0.156149 -0.165766 0.8693
AR(3) -0.292889 0.139279 -2.102902 0.0425
R-square 0.504153 Mean dependent var 0.930320
Adjusted R-square 0.462833 S.D. dependent var 7.754088
S.E. of regression 5.683103 Akaike info criterion 6.407511
Sum squared resid 1162.716 Schwarz criterion 6.576399
Log likelihood -124.1502 F-statistic 12.20103
Durbin-Watson stat 1.552024 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000012
Inverted AR Roots .62+.48i .62 -.48i   -.48
68 This statistic shows that after accounting for lagged correlation, other coefficients on the explanatory 
variable were significantly different from zero.
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taBlE 7 - tEst FoR JoInt sIGnIFIcancE oF ExPlanatoRy vaRIaBlEs 
FoR PoRtuGal: IntERwaR yEaRs
Redundant Variables: TARIFF PTNRTAR TARIFF*PTNRTAR EFFDIST
        TARIFF*EFFDIST KIDSKOOLGR(-1) RAILWAYSGR(-1)
        EXPORTSGR(-1) EXPORTS D(LANDLABOR) URBGR(-1)
F-statistic 30.38049 Probability 0.002413
Log likelihood ratio 88.74600 Probability 0.000000
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1919 1938
Included observations: 20
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 4.361689 1.876425 2.324467 0.0345
AR(1) -0.002245 0.143564 -0.015640 0.9877
AR(2) -0.133483 0.176019 -0.758347 0.4600
AR(3) 0.472508 0.195776 2.413511 0.0290
AR(4) -0.216553 0.306363 -0.706851 0.4905
R-square 0.467834 Mean dependent var 4.012774
Adjusted R-square 0.325922 S.D. dependent var 10.47741
S.E. of regression 8.602191 Akaike info criterion 7.354229
Sum squared resid 1109.965 Schwarz criterion 7.603162
Log likelihood -68.54229 F-statistic 3.296667
Durbin-Watson stat 1.949481 Prob(F-statistic) 0.039757
Inverted AR Roots .48 -.22i .48+.22i  -.48 -.74i  -.48+.74i
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taBlE 8 - tEst FoR JoInt sIGnIFIcancE oF ExPlanatoRy vaRIaBlEs 
FoR BRazIl: IntERwaR yEaRs
Redundant Variables: TARIFF PTNRTAR TARIFF*PTNRTAR
        EFFDIST TARIFF*EFFDIST KIDSKOOLGR(-1) RAILWAYGR(-1)
        EXPGR(-1) EXPORTS D(LANDLABOR)
F-statistic 8.353755 Probability 0.0085769
Log likelihood ratio 54.05797 Probability 0.000000
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: GROWTH_CH_REV
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 1919 1938
Included observations: 20
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.769991 1.898681 1.458902 0.1639
AR(1) 0.500605 0.157301 3.182465 0.0058
AR(2) -0.059735 0.201374 -0.296639 0.7706
AR(3) -0.394322 0.211508 -1.864338 0.0807
R-square 0.423063 Mean dependent var 2.675487
Adjusted R-square 0.314887 S.D. dependent var 8.748866
S.E. of regression 7.241572 Akaike info criterion 6.974410
Sum squared resid 839.0459 Schwarz criterion 7.173557
Log likelihood -65.74410 F-statistic 3.910883
Durbin-Watson stat 1.527942 Prob(F-statistic) 0.028557
Inverted AR Roots .54 -.63i .54+.63i   -.58
69  This statistic shows that after accounting for lagged correlation, other coefficients on explanatory 
variable were significantly different from zero.
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aPPEndIx 2 - data
Comparison of CH data (annual growth in per capita Revenue, Cr$ at 1949 prices) 
with CW data (annual growth in GDP per capita, 1990 US $)  
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For Brazil, a series of regressions with alternative dependent variables were perfor-
med separately for the period before and after the World War I.  From the graph 
it is clear that CH data exhibits more variability, especially before 1900. Indeed, 
pre-1900 data points simply seem to be a backward projection of the average rate 
of growth after that year. Therefore we used the CH data in preference to those of 
CW, derived from Goldsmith. The dependent variable used was annual growth in 
GDP capita.
70 Population for 1934 in Table C-2 of Contador-Haddad was corrected.
